Halderman Dominion Report
Election integrity groups commissioned a report by a computer science professor at the University of Michigan, J. Alex Halderman, who is an election security expert. Halderman produced a 25K-word report that’s so explosive neither the federal judge in charge of the case nor the U.S. federal government wants it released to the public. Halderman asserts that Georgia’s electronic voting machines “suffer from specific, highly exploitable vulnerabilities that allow attackers to change votes despite the state’s purported defenses”. Who owns and operates those electronic voting machines in Georgia? Dominion Voting Systems.
Halderman was given 12 weeks of access to an unused Dominion ICX voting machine — the same machines used in Georgia and 16 other states. His conclusions completely destroy the false narrative about the 2020 election being “the most secure election in history”. In fact, Halderman claims that “Georgia voters face an extreme risk that [voting machine]-based attacks could manipulate their individual votes and alter election outcomes”. Since Halderman is a well known election security expert who has testified before Congress, the usual attempts to discredit him as either a conspiracy theorist or an amateur have not been successful.
In August 2021, Halderman made a sworn declaration to the court regarding the vulnerabilites of the Dominion machine that he inspected. The following are excerpts from that declaration:
“In my report — a 25K-word document that is the product of 12 weeks of intensive testing of the Dominion equipment provided by Fulton County, I find that Georgia’s BMDs (ballot marking devices) contain multiple severe security flaws. Attackers could exploit these flaws to install malicious software, either with temporary physical access (such as that of voters in the polling place) or remotely from election management systems. I explain in detail how such malware, once installed, could alter voters’ votes while subverting all the procedural protections practiced by the State, including acceptance testing, hash validation, logic and accuracy testing, external firmware validation, and risk-limiting audits…
My report concludes, inter alia, that Georgia’s BMDs are not sufficiently secured against technical compromise to withstand vote-altering attacks by bad actors who are likely to target future elections in the state; that the BMDs’ vulnerabilities compromise the auditability of Georgia’s paper ballots; that the BMDs can be compromised to the same extent as or more easily than the DREs (direct-recording electronic voting machines) they replaced; and that using these vulnerable BMDs for all in-person voters, as Georgia does, greatly magnifies the level of security risk compared to using hand-marked paper ballots…
Suppose for the sake of argument that the Presidential election outcome in Georgia had been altered by hacking the BMDs, and there were complaints from the 832 voters that Dr. Gilbert has calculated. What then? It seems all but certain that these complaints would have been dismissed or drowned out in the cacophonous aftermath of the election or simply disregarded by election workers at the polling sites as voter errors. Yet the official count, the risk-limiting audit, and the recount would all have found the wrong winner, and there would be no way to recover any altered vote or correct the election outcome short of rerunning the election. With a mere 832 complaints among 5 million participating voters (amidst a sea of other complaints, real and imagined), it is unlikely that poll workers or election officials, including State Defendants, would realize or even suspect there was a systemic problem with the BMDs, and it is completely implausible that they would take the drastic but necessary step of asking Georgians to vote again.”
Emerald Robinson’s The Right Way